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through integrative modeling of both public and
private medical text
Andrew J McMurry1,2,3,5*†, Britt Fitch1*†, Guergana Savova2, Isaac S Kohane1,2,4 and Ben Y Reis1,2Abstract
Background: Physician notes routinely recorded during patient care represent a vast and underutilized resource for
human disease studies on a population scale. Their use in research is primarily limited by the need to separate
confidential patient information from clinical annotations, a process that is resource-intensive when performed
manually. This study seeks to create an automated method for de-identifying physician notes that does not require
large amounts of private information: in addition to training a model to recognize Protected Health Information
(PHI) within private physician notes, we reverse the problem and train a model to recognize non-PHI words and
phrases that appear in public medical texts.
Methods: Public and private medical text sources were analyzed to distinguish common medical words and
phrases from Protected Health Information. Patient identifiers are generally nouns and numbers that appear
infrequently in medical literature. To quantify this relationship, term frequencies and part of speech tags were
compared between journal publications and physician notes. Standard medical concepts and phrases were then
examined across ten medical dictionaries. Lists and rules were included from the US census database and
previously published studies. In total, 28 features were used to train decision tree classifiers.
Results: The model successfully recalled 98% of PHI tokens from 220 discharge summaries. Cost sensitive
classification was used to weight recall over precision (98% F10 score, 76% F1 score). More than half of the false
negatives were the word “of” appearing in a hospital name. All patient names, phone numbers, and home
addresses were at least partially redacted. Medical concepts such as “elevated white blood cell count” were
informative for de-identification. The results exceed the previously approved criteria established by four Institutional
Review Boards.
Conclusions: The results indicate that distributional differences between private and public medical text can be
used to accurately classify PHI. The data and algorithms reported here are made freely available for evaluation and
improvement.
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Physician's notes contain information that may never be
recorded in a coded format in the patient health record
[1-3], such as family history [4], smoking history [5-7],
and descriptions of lab results [8,9]. Nonetheless, the
“uncoded” information buried in physician notes is so
valuable that numerous attempts have been made to-
wards indexing and sharing notes for research use. How-
ever, since physician notes can contain patient names,
home addresses, social security numbers, and other
types of Protected Health Information (PHI) [10], vast
quantities of doctors’ notes have gone largely unused for
medical research studies. Methods to simultaneously
protect patient privacy and increase research utility are
needed – as the number of electronic health record sys-
tems increases and with it the opportunity to study lar-
ger numbers of patients [11-13].
Existing methods for de-identifying medical texts
range from simple rule-based systems to sophisticated
machine learning algorithms [14,15]. The majority of
currently implemented methods are rule-based systems
that match patterns and dictionaries of expressions that
frequently contain PHI [16]. The advantage of rule-
based systems is that experts can quickly define rules
and iteratively fine tune them to achieve higher accur-
acy. While rule-based systems have shown high recall in
some settings [16], they often have the disadvantage of
hard coding rules to a specific note format or physician
writing style, resulting in poor performance in other
contexts. Adjusting existing rule systems for use at other
medical centers is often too costly, limiting broad use
across institutions. This problem is well recognized
[14,15], and has prompted efforts using an alternative,
machine learning approach. Rather than using the expert
to author rules, the rules for PHI removal are “learned”
by training an algorithm using human annotated exam-
ples (i.e. a supervised learning task). For example,
competitors in the i2b2 de-identification challenge
[14] were asked to train or tune their algorithms on
one set of human annotated notes and then validate
their best model on a separate set of annotated notes.
Generally, the highest scoring algorithms used ma-
chine learning methods such as conditional random
fields [17-20], decision trees [21], support vector ma-
chines [22,23], and meta-classifiers that combine and
weight different strategies for high-recall with false
positive filtering [24].
The work reported here was trained and validated
on the same i2b2 challenge datasets, which allows for
comparison to prior work. Our algorithm performed
favorably with regards to recall, albeit with lower pre-
cision (see results). The primary difference between
our method and other top scores in the i2b2 chal-
lenge is the extensive use of publicly available medicaltexts to learn the distributional characteristics of indi-
vidual PHI tokens that could appear in any type of
physician note. This is in contrast to other models
that use features that may be specific to the style and
format of discharge summaries such as section head-
ings [21], sentence position [18], and longer token se-
quences [17-20]. We show that publicly available
medical texts provide an informative background dis-
tribution of sharable medical words, a property that is
largely underutilized in patient privacy research.
Methods
Instead of trying to recognize PHI words in physician
notes, we reversed the problem towards recognizing
non-PHI words. We asked, “what are the chances that
a word or phrase would appear in a medical journal
or medical dictionary? What are the lexical properties
of PHI words? To what extent can we use publicly
available data to recognize data that is private and
confidential?”
While human annotated datasets of PHI are few in
number and difficult to obtain, examples of public med-
ical text are broadly available and generally underutilized
for de-identification. By definition, medical journal pub-
lications provide the distributional evidence for words
that are not PHI. Of course, some medical words will
end up being proper names but the public corpora pro-
vide a heuristic measure of likelihood that we exploit as
described below. In this context, relatively fewer human
annotated examples are treated as approximations of the
distributional properties of PHI. Lexical comparisons be-
tween PHI words and non-PHI words reveal that PHI
words are generally nouns and numbers – whereas verbs
and adjectives are probably ok to share -- especially
medically relevant verbs and adjectives that are of more
relevant to research studies. Publicly available lists of
suspicious words and expert rules are also incorporated
into this algorithm, such as US census data and the
Beckwith regex list [16]. We combine the discrimination
power of these complementary perspectives to achieve
improved de-identification performance. As an add-
itional safeguard, notes can be indexed [25] and later
searched using coded medical concepts, thereby redu-
cing the number of full-text reports that need to be
shared in early phases of research [26].
Design principles
The Scrubber was designed with the following general
observations about physician notes and other types of
medical text: (1) words that occur only in physician
notes have increased risk for PHI, especially nouns
and numbers which are the only types of PHI words;
(2) words that occur in medical publications are not
likely to refer to any specific patient; (3) words and
Figure 1 Observations of physician notes with other types of
medical text. 1) Nouns and Numbers that only occur in physician
notes are probably PHI. 2)Words that occur frequently in medical
publications are not likely to contain PHI. 3)Words and phrases that
occur frequently in medical dictionaries are not likely to contain PHI.
4) Words shared in all three medical text sources are very unlikely to
contain PHI.
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individually named patients; (4) words shared in many
publically available medical text sources are very un-
likely to contain PHI (Figure 1).
Different types of PHI
The risk to patient confidentiality differs among the 8
major types of HIPAA defined PHI elements (Table 1).
The acceptance criteria of the IRB focused on removing
text that uniquely refers to a single patient including pa-
tient names, IDs such as medical record numbers, phone
numbers, and home addresses. Fortunately, single pa-
tient identifiers are rarely necessary in patient research.
As a secondary objective, this study sought to classify all
types of PHI defined by HIPAA. This includes features
that may refer to many patients, such as a hospital
name, patient age, date of service, or doctor. These fea-
tures are useful for studies of disease over time andTable 1 Types of PHI and their risk to patient
confidentiality
PHI type Minimum disclosure Risk
Hospital LDS Minimal
Age LDS Minimal
Date LDS Minimal
Doctor LDS Minimal
Location Identified High
Patient Identified High
ID Identified High
Phone Identified High
Minimum Disclosure refers to the level of permission typically required by an
IRB. Limited Data Sets (LDS) contain features about a patient that refer to
more than one patient. Identified level access almost always refers to a
single patient, such as a patient name, medical record number, or
phone number.should not necessarily be scrubbed if Limited Data Set
[27] access is permitted by the hospital privacy board.
We anticipated that each type of PHI would have a
unique set of association rules. For example, patient
names are nouns whereas medical record numbers are
numbers. Learning different association rules [28] for each
type of PHI has the added benefit that additional weight
can be placed on highest risk elements, such as the patient
name or home address. All PHI types are generally repre-
sented as nouns and numbers with low term frequencies,
low occurrence in medical controlled vocabularies, and
non-zero regular expression matches of some type. Non-
PHI words generally have higher term frequencies, higher
occurrence in medical vocabularies and near zero matches
in regular expressions of any type.
Feature set construction
The Scrubber pipeline constructs a feature set in four
phases: lexical, frequency, dictionary, and known-PHI
(Figure 2). First, the document instance is split into frag-
ments and analyzed for part of speech and capitalization
usage [29]. Second, term frequencies are assigned to each
token in the document. Third, each fragment is matched
against dictionaries of controlled medical vocabularies [30].
Lastly, US census data [31] and regular expression patterns
are applied for each of the eight categories of PHI.
Apache cTAKES and Apache UIMA provide the foun-
dation for the Scrubber pipeline. The data processing
pipeline is provided by Apache UIMA project [32], an
engineering framework commonly used in Natural
Language Processing [33]. Of note, UIMA does not provide
any pre-built components for text processing, it provides
the main “scaffolding” and flow between user developed
components. In the lexical phase, Apache cTAKES splits
each document into sentences [34] and determines the part
of speech for each token. Apache cTAKES is especially
appropriate because it has been extensively trained on
medical documents [29]. In the term frequency phase,
the count of each token is retrieved from a corpus of
open access medical publications previously annotated by
Apache cTAKES. In the dictionary phase, each fragment is
compared against phrases in publicly available sources,
such as ICD9 diagnoses and LOINC laboratory concepts.
The annotation pipeline produces a high dimensional
feature set that is very sparse, making the classification
step more difficult. There are a number of ways to
reduce dimensionality and increase feature set density,
such as clustering similar features [35-37], removing
features with low information content [38], reducing
the number of class labels [28], and aggregating
feature counts. Aggregating feature counts provided
adequate feature density and reduced the dimension-
ality without discarding features that could be inform-
ative. Specifically, features were aggregated by source
Figure 2 Phases of the Scrubber annotation pipeline. Lexical Phase: split document into sentences, tag part of speech for each token.
Frequency Phase: calculate term frequency with and without part of speech tag. Dictionary Phase: search for each word/phrase in ten medical
dictionaries. Known PHI Phase: match US census names and textual patterns for each PHI type.
McMurry et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2013, 13:112 Page 4 of 11
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/13/112and type with respect to processing phase: lexical,
frequency, dictionary, and known PHI (Table 2).
Classification
The feature set is then processed through Weka [39]
using a J48 decision tree [40] classification algorithm,
a popular open source implementation of the C4.5 deci-
sion tree algorithm. J48 was chosen for several reasons.
First, decision trees do not require “binning” value ranges
to be effective [41]. This was useful because the correct
value ranges were not known prior to classifier training.
Second, decision trees can build a model for multiple class
types. This is important because different types of PHI
have different rules associated with them. For example,
patient names are nouns whereas medical record numbers
are numbers. A binary classifier would ignore these char-
acteristic differences across PHI types and likely cause
more errors.
Training
The primary data used for training and testing was the
I2B2 de-id challenge data [14]. This data consists of 669
training cases and 220 testing cases. The cases are a fullyTable 2 Complete list of all 28 features annotated by the NLP
Lexical Frequency M
Part of Speech Term Frequency (Token) #
Part of Speech (Binned) Term Frequency (Token, Part of Speech) #
Capitalization #
Word or Number #
Length #
#
#
#
#
#
#
In the lexical phase, part of speech and capitalization usage is annotated for each w
of appearance in public and private medical texts. In the dictionary phase, each wo
knownPHI phase, tokens and phrases are compared against suspicious patterns of Hannotated gold standard set of discharge summaries.
To calculate frequencies of word occurrences, we ran-
domly selected 10,000 publicly available peer reviewed
medical publications. This was necessary as many
valid word tokens appear only once or not at all in
any random selection of physician notes. Using more
than 10,000 publications for training did not alter
performance, and was computationally feasible using
inexpensive commodity hardware.
On average there were 520 words (tokens) per case,
and an average of 39 PHI words per case. As expected,
most word tokens were not patient identifiers (PHI) --
the ratio of PHI words to non-PHI words was 1:15.
Training a classifier using all of the available training in-
stances would highly favor non-PHI classifications [42].
To address this issue, the training set was compiled
using all of the PHI words and an equally sized random
selection of non-PHI words.
Results
Summary
The training model was applied to an independent valid-
ation corpus of 220 discharge summaries from the i2b2pipeline
edical dictionary Known PHI
matches HL7 2.5 # matches US Census Names
matches HL7 3.0
matches ICD9 CM # matches for pattern HOSPITAL
matches ICD10 CM # matches for pattern AGE
matches ICD10 PCS # matches for pattern DATE
matches LOINC # matches for pattern DOCTOR
matches MESH # matches for pattern LOCATION
matches RXNORM # matches for pattern PATIENT
matches SNOMED # matches for pattern ID
matches COSTAR # matches for pattern PHONE
consectutive tokens any dictionary # consecutive tokens any pattern
ord token. In the frequency phase, each word is annotated with the frequency
rd is compared to a list of standard medical concepts in UMLS sources. In the
IPAA identifiers.
kens removed
ber of confidential tokens missed
tokens removed
number of public tokens removed
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result meeting stated IRB requirements of high recall at
the cost of precision. This method achieved its goal of
very high recall (98%) and F10 (98%) albeit at the cost
of a lower precision (62%) and F1 (76%). Compared
to the seven participant groups in the original i2b2
de-identification challenge the scores reported in this
paper would have placed first overall in recall and last
overall in precision. The low precision is expected for
several reasons. First, we did not tailor dictionaries
and patterns for the i2b2 corpus and elected for an
out-of-the-box approach which is more likely to mimic
an initial deployment scenario. Secondly, our IRB stated
that the most important metric for patient privacy is
recall. In this context, recall is the percentage of confiden-
tial tokens that were removed relative to confidential
tokens that were missed (Equation 1). Precision is the
percentage of confidential tokens that were removed
relative to the number of public tokens that were
erroneously removed (Equation 2). The automated
performance matches or exceeds that of two human
evaluators [43] and preserves the readability of the
original text [43].
Equation 1: Recall
recall ¼ number of confidential to
number of confidential tokens removedþ num
Equation 2: Precision
precision ¼ number of confidential
number of confidential tokens removedþFigure 3 Classifier results. Lexical features include part of speech, capital
frequency across 10,000 medical journal publications. UMLS features refer t
dictionaries. Known PHI features include the US Census List and the pattern
feature groups using the J48 algorithm. Boosting used ten iterations of the
address potential false positives created during the boosting process.Classification accuracy
Each feature group was trained and tested using a J48
classifier (Figure 3) using only the feature group spe-
cified in Figure 4. Lexical features include part of
speech, capitalization usage, and token length. Frequency
features refer to the token frequency across 10,000 med-
ical journal publications. UMLS features refer to the
number of matches for each token or phrase in ten
medical dictionaries. Known PHI features include the
US Census List and the patterns previously provided
by Beckwith et al. [16]. All features were then in-
cluded into a single baseline classifier using the J48
algorithm. Boosting was then performed to increase
classifier recall of the minority PHI class types. Boosting
was accomplished using ten iterations of the Adaboost
method using default settings in Weka. Because boosting
can lead to higher numbers of false positives, false
positive filtering was then performed. The false posi-
tive filter was achieved by analyzing the 100 nearest
neighbors of each token in the test set to ensure
that all 100 neighbors in the training set have the
same class label. If all 100 NN had the same class
label, these samples were considered either backgroundization usage, and token length. Frequency features refer to the token
o the number of matches for each token or phrase in ten medical
s previously provided by Beckwith et al. Baseline classifier utilizes all
Adaboost method. The false positive filter used in the final score to
Figure 4 Part of speech is highly informative for the PHI class. Normalized pointwise mutual information was calculated between each Part
Of Speech (POS) and PHI class. A score of 1 signifies the POS and PHI type always occur together. A score of −1 signifies the POS and PHI type
never occur together. Clustering of the scoring matrix was calculated by Euclidean distance of the normalized scores. The results reveal that
Nouns and Numbers have distinct groupings of PHI classes whereas all other parts of speech reduce the probability of any private PHI class.
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PHI label.
Misclassifications
The words “of”, “and”, “home”, “hospital”, and “services”
were overwhelmingly the most commonly missed PHI
words. These common words account for 124 of 173 par-
tial misses, and pose little to no risk to patient privacy.
We performed a manual review of each misclassifica-
tion and determined that no unique identifiers were left
fully intact. Partial redactions – such as properly remov-
ing the patient last name but missing the patient first
name were rare (13 word tokens in 12 cases). Lower risk
identifiers such as hospital name and date of treatment
were also rare. Only two dates and 2 hospital names
were left fully intact.
Lexical features
Every type of PHI is a noun or number (Figure 4). Inter-
estingly, this fact alone yielded 96% recall (Figure 3).
However, many naturally occurring words and medically
relevant concepts can also appear as nouns and num-
bers. To distinguish PHI from nouns and numbers that
are naturally occurring, a term frequency calculation
was applied. Similarly, nouns and numbers with medical
relevance were distinguished by their presence in one or
more medical vocabularies.
Term frequencies
Medical publications do not refer to individually named
patients. Even in medical case studies, the patient name,
home address, phone number, and medical record numbermust be withheld in accordance with law. This guarantees
that all high-risk PHI elements in Table 1 will not be
present in the publication dataset. It was therefore not
surprising to find that patient specific identifiers were not
frequently reported in the text of medical publications. As
a result, classification of PHI using only term frequency
features and part of speech yielded high scrubbing per-
formance with 92% recall.
As expected, a first or last name would sometimes
match an author name in the publication text. However,
since author names and references list were removed
during preprocessing, the overlap in names was mini-
mized. There are other examples where patient iden-
tifiers can overlap with text in publications, for
example when a patient lives on a street with the
same name as a medical facility used in a published
study. Nevertheless, patient identifiers are much less
likely to appear in journal publications. To test and
quantify this assumption, term frequencies were cal-
culated across all word tokens in publication, train-
ing, and test datasets. Training and test datasets were
split into groups of words containing PHI and not
containing PHI. Histograms were then created, where
the x-axis is the number of times a word appeared in
all medical publications and the y-axis is the number
of distinct words. A small percentage of common
words created a skewed distribution, which was log
normalized for visualization clarity. Figure 5 shows
that PHI words are less frequently used in journal
publications than non-PHI words. This is true with
or without considering the part of speech for both
the training and test datasets.
Figure 5 Term frequency distributions in PHI and non-PHI word tokens. In each of the four histograms, the log normalized term frequency
(x-axis) is plotted against the percentage of word tokens. PHI words (red) are more common on the left hand side of each histogram, showing
that PHI words tend to be rarer than non-phi words (blue). Top Figures (a) and (b) contain training data. Bottom Figures (c) and (d) contain
testing data. Histograms for Training and Testing are characteristically similar. Term frequency histograms on the left (a) and (c) refer to words
matched according to their part of speech. Term frequency histograms on the right (b) and (d) refer to raw word matches.
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Ten vocabularies in the Unified Medical Language
System were selected in order to span a very wide range of
demographic terms, diagnoses, lab tests, medication names,
and procedures. Surprisingly, a decision tree trained only to
distinguish PHI from medical concepts yielded very high
recall (94%), albeit with poor precision (12%). This suggests
that there is almost no overlap between medical concepts
and patient identifiers. These findings provide evidence that
automatic retrieval of coded medical concepts (autocoding)
is also useful for de-identification. In this way, parallel
autocoding and de-identification provides maximum re-
search utility while minimizing the risk of patient disclosure
(Additional file 1: Table S2).
Regular expressions
Regular Expressions yielded the most balanced ratio of
recall (80%) to precision (60%) of any feature group
tested in isolation (Figure 3). This matches our experi-
ence using a previous version of the HMS Scrubber in
new medical center settings without customization and
without inspecting the pathology report header [16]. We
expected the regular expressions to outperform all other
feature groups with respect to dates, phone numbers,and ages but this was not the case. This either means
that we used Beckwith’s regular expression rules incor-
rectly or there are more ways to express these simple
concepts than one might expect. Nevertheless, regular
expressions slightly improved the overall classification
specificity. The only changes to Beckwith’s regular ex-
pressions was the addition of one pattern for date, two
for hospital names, and three for IDs.
Quantifying the distance between public and private
medical texts
Open access medical journals provide a heuristic meas-
ure of the words and phrases used to describe medical
topics. Estimating the distributions of non-PHI tokens is
therefore informative for recognizing PHI. To quantify
this relationship, a vector space model [44-46] was cre-
ated for journal publications and the i2b2 datasets. First,
each dataset was annotated as described in “feature set
construction”. Second, each numeric feature was nor-
malized in the range between zero and one and mean
subtracted. Third, the principal components were calcu-
lated for each part of speech (using defaults of Matlab
pca method). Principal components were selected if they
had >1 explained variance for a total explained variance
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compared in vector space by measuring the dot product
(Equation 4).
Equation 3: F-measure
Fβ ¼ 1þ β2
   precision  recall
β2  precision þ recall
Equation 4: Vector similarity
sim dj; q
  ¼ dj  q
∥dj∥∥q∥
The similarity metric was then used to test the as-
sumption that public texts provide a heuristic measure
of the background distribution of non-PHI tokens
(Figure 6). The overwhelming majority of public to-
kens from journal articles were more similar to non-PHI
examples in the training set. This analysis revealed that
confidential PHI tokens had far fewer similar examples
than non-PHI tokens. We used this fact to create a false
positives filtering component with a simple rule: if 100
nearest neighbors of a test token all had the same class
label in the training set then that label is highly unlikely to
be not PHI. In rare cases, the 100 nearest neighbors would
all refer to the same type of PHI which we considered
strong evidence for the PHI type.
Validation
The i2b2 Challenge Data includes surrogate names that
were constructed by permuting the syllables of real
names in the US Census. This means that the provided
names of patients, doctors, and hospitals are highlyFigure 6 Distance between tokens appearing in private and public m
(distance) in vector space between tokens in the private training set and to
669 medical publications were analyzed for their pairwise distances. An eq
selected from train. The boxplot shows 25th and 75th percentiles for distan
reveals that public terms that are not PHI are more similar to publication tounlikely to be realistic examples, which could give an
unnatural advantage to term frequency calculations and
thus artificially improve classifier performance.
To verify that this was not the case, the i2b2 surrogate
names were replaced with real names from the Medicare
General Hospital Information file [47] and the US patent
office list of US inventors [48]. Each hospital name in
the i2b2 training and test datasets was replaced with a
hospital name from Medicare. Each patient and doctor
name in the i2b2 data was replaced with a randomly se-
lected name from the list of US inventors. In total,
Medicare provided 4838 unique hospital names and the
USPTO provided 4301229 inventors (1473329 unique).
Validation results were very similar to the original re-
sults (Table 3).
Discussion
Can we use vast quantities of public medical text to de-
identify confidential information within private physician
notes? Can we accelerate the rate of sharing physician
notes for research without compromising patient confi-
dentiality? Can we achieve these goals while respecting
the challenges and responsibilities among hospital priv-
acy boards? These questions motivated the authors to
compare public and private medical texts to learn the
distributions and lexical properties of Protected Health
Information. The results of this experiment show that
publicly available medical texts are highly informative
for PHI recognition, resulting in performance that is
likely to be approved for research use among by hospital
review boards. The vast majority of misclassifications
were common words appearing in hospital names, whichedical texts. Vector space model was used to capture the similarities
kens in the public publications set. In total, 669 physician notes and
ual number of public (non-PHI) tokens and private tokens were
ces from publication tokens to training tokens. The leftmost column
kens than any other group.
Table 3 Classifier validation results
Classifier validation Precision F1 F10 Recall
Baseline 50 67 98 99
Boosted 59 74 98 99
Boosted + FP filtering 61 75 98 98
Validation was performed by replacing the i2b2 surrogate names with real
names from Medicare and the US patent office. This was done to ensure that
the model is not limited to the i2b2 surrogates. The results are similar to the
original results.
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of this de-identification process is that coded medical
concepts [49] are also stored for later search [26] and re-
trieval [50]. This approach to de-identification both re-
duces unauthorized disclosures and increases authorized
use [51], a position previously confirmed by numerous
hospital privacy boards [16,26,50].
Comparing public and private text sources reveals
interesting properties of PHI. Words in physician notes
that frequently appear in medical journal publications and
concept dictionaries are highly unlikely to contain PHI.
Conversely, words in physician notes that are nouns and
numbers are more likely to contain PHI. It is interesting
to speculate just how far publicly available text can be lev-
eraged for de-identification tasks, and we encourage other
researchers to use our annotated datasets and open source
software for use in their own medical studies.
In a state of the art review of de-identification, Ozuner
and Szolovits appropriately ask “how good is good
enough? [14]” In this study, we sought to achieve
performance levels that were already considered satis-
factory by hospital privacy boards [16] with minimal
investment. Numerous tradeoffs were made to achieve
this goal. First, recall was strongly favored over precision,
especially for patient names and ID numbers that have
highest risk of disclosure. Second, we favored default con-
figuration over hospital-specific human refinement. In our
experience, site-specific modification of patient names
lists and regular expressions can be laborious and can lead
to “overscrubbing” information that is valuable for re-
search. Third, we needed the algorithm to run on a single
computer using commodity hardware, both to satisfy IRB
concerns over data-duplication and reuse hardware
already in place. Fourth, we wanted to make as few as-
sumptions as possible about the training set to avoid un-
necessary overfitting.
There were several limitations to this study. Term fre-
quency calculations were performed for single word to-
kens. Increasing the term frequency to use two or more
words might improve patient name recognition. For ex-
ample, patients are more likely to have a first or last
name in common with an author than a full name. Simi-
larly, patient home addresses are highly unlikely to be
found in published medical journals. However, commonand rare word sequences can vary considerably across
the different types and formats of physician notes and
journal publications. We chose instead to err on the side
of caution and use a single token model rather than
ngrams or conditional random fields.
There is also the potential that we too have overfit our
model to training examples and were fortunate enough
to have the model validated in an independent sample.
There are several cases where classifying PHI in new phys-
ician notes could be significantly less accurate. PHI words
and phrases that frequently appear in medical publications
and dictionaries are the most difficult to classify, although
the number of times this occurs appears negligible. Inco-
herently written physician notes may be difficult to tag for
part of speech, which would likely degrade classifier accur-
acy. Datasets that have different probability distributions
and term frequency could also pose problems. In each of
these potentially limiting examples, a new corpus would
have to be characteristically different from the testing and
training examples studied here.
We recommend that this de-identification method
be used according to procedures that were previously
acknowledged by four hospital IRBs [16,26]. The
recommended workflow is as follows. Physician notes are
de-identified and autocoded such that the scrubbed report
is saved in a secured database and searchable according to
medical vocabularies. Search access is limited to autho-
rized investigators affiliated with the institution hosting
the data, and under no circumstances should the textual
data be made available for public download. Searching for
patient cohorts matching study criteria occurs in an
anonymized manner, meaning that only counts are
returned with the first level of access. After finding a co-
hort of interest, an investigator may apply for access to re-
view the deidentified cases. By increasing the level of
access commensurate with the needs of a study [26], the
risk to patient disclosure is minimized while allowing
many investigators the ability to query and browse the
valuable collection medical notes. The methods proposed
here can be put to practical use today to help unlock the
tremendous research potential of vast quantities of free-
text physician notes accumulating in electronic medical
record systems worldwide [13].Additional file
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